Flintlocks and Knobkerries - Lessons in Byzantine Thinking for the Information Age

Fri, 20 Nov 2009 10:41

During the late 1980s a progressive activist gave an analysis of the state of the nation at a National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) conference held at UCT. His name has long since been lost in a cloud of Jameson and Black Label but here at the New Frontier we vaguely remember what he said about the media and the "system". Something along the lines that they don't tell you what they're up to all of the time but they always tell you what they're up to.

I was reminded of this idea on 30th October when www.realclearworld.com, an American portal that collates thinkpieces from quality papers worldwide, published a series of articles on the foreign policy challenges facing the Obama administration. Several dealt with the news that Iran had rejected the joint proposal (agreed to by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia), to ship 70 percent of its low-enriched uranium to Russia this year. Here is Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writing for the Washington Post:

"Iran, has settled back into its old game-playing...The deal, blessed and promoted by International Atomic Energy Agency ... was really more a test of Iran's intentions than a decisive breakthrough. So now the test results are in: Iran's intentions, it seems, are not good...Tehran is obviously probing to see whether President Obama can play hardball or whether he can be played. If Obama has any hope of getting anywhere with the mullahs, he needs to show them he means business, now..."

Not to be outdone, the New York Times carried a series of articles, which highlighted the gravity of the unfolding drama. According to the Times, the Iranian response has the potential to unwind President Obama's "effort to buy time to resolve the nuclear standoff." A "senior European official" is quoted, saying:

"The key issue is that Iran does not agree to export its lightly enriched uranium. That's not a minor detail. That's the whole point of the deal."

Uh oh. Perhaps it's time to check whether one has enough oil and gold in the old investment portfolio. It seems as if those chaps in Tehran have a poor grasp of history. As any schoolboy should know, there are two political parties in America: the mommy party (terribly-nice-if-a-bit-naff Democrats) and the daddy party (nasty, old Republicans). Conventional wisdom would have us believe that the democrats are a bit of a soft touch and that republicans are more likely to send in the marines and generally mix it up in "foreign entanglements". The historical record shows otherwise.

During the twentieth century, America fought seven major wars, two of which are still raging. With the exception of George W Bush (Afghanistan and Iraq) and his father (the Gulf War), the presidents - Wilson (WWI), Roosevelt (WWII), Truman (Korea) and Johnson (Vietnam) - who took the decision to go to war, were all democrats. And it was a democrat (Kennedy) who came closest to pushing the proverbial button in 1962. This makes sense on a certain level. Even children know that when mommy gets mad there are "serious consequences". Unfortunately people who are enthralled in totalitarian ideologies seldom hear, let alone understand, the wisdom that comes from the mouths of babes.

And so we must gaze, like horrified bystanders at the scene of a slow motion car crash, as Mahmoud Ahmendinejad repeats the mistake made by the Kaiser, the Fuhrer, "Uncle Joe" Stalin and the bumbling Mr. Khrushchev, all of whom saw Americans in general and Democrats in particular as irredeemably decadent and weak.

For an idea of what might be coming down the track, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard could do worse than peruse the writings of Edward N. Luttwak, described by the Weekly Standard as "one of America's leading strategic minds" who "literally wrote the book on the subject with "Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace":

"...while they may not have written dissertations and white papers on the subject, the ancient Romans had an instinctive grasp of strategic logic embedded in their culture, which allowed not only continuity across changing regimes, but also for strategic evolution in response to a changing security environment." (emphasis added)

During the first century AD, Rome employed large field armies capable of offensive action against the Goths and Celts. By the second century, imperial defence of conquered territory was based on fortified frontiers (to keep the Goths and Celts out). When these frontiers collapsed in the third century the empire resorted to fortified cities backed by mobile legions capable of counter-attacking and repelling the pesky old Goths and Celts. In each case, imperial strategy evolved to account for changing conditions. After the fall of the Western Empire in 476, the Eastern Empire (known to us as the Byzantine Empire but run by people who called themselves Romans) made this tradition of continuity and change famous for another 1000 years, until the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

In the modern era, the British displayed similar adaptability. After the loss of America in the 1776 revolution (which caused a severe crisis of confidence amongst the Anglo-Saxons and led King George III to have a nervous breakdown), imperial policy towards colonial subjects became much more flexible. Over the next century it evolved to accommodate different forms of sovereignty and governance, ranging from indirect rule (e.g. the nominally independent Orange River Sovereignty, Bechuanaland, the pre-republican Transvaal State or numerous Indian principalities) through limited parliamentary self-government (e.g. the Cape Colony, Australia, New Zealand, or Canada) to direct rule (the hapless fate of Ireland, much of Africa and the rest of India). The result was arguably the most stable period in imperial history - when the "sun never set" over the Empire.

Here at the New Frontier we have precious little nostalgia for the late, unlamented British (or any other) Empire. But we find it interesting that empires sometimes live beyond their supposed sell-by dates. One way the United States of America has been responding to reports of its imminent demise is through the use of "network-centric strategy". The concept has its origins in the military, but as so often happens in America, has been widely adopted in the corporate world as well. A network-centric approach to strategy (whether applied to the rarefied atmosphere of geopolitics, marketing widgets to consumers or the sustainable development of the humblest local authority) begins with the recognition that all the players in the game operate within networks. These are made up of other players, each with their own strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, loyalties, agendas and so forth. Winning the game depends on understanding the connections between the players and building strong alliances with those who share your interests while ganging up on those who don't.

So far so good - people have been doing that sort of thing to each other for millennia, as vividly described in the annals of both Machiavelli and Sun Tzu. Even we peace-loving South Africans are not averse to the odd bit of ganging up from time to time. Where the Americans have come up with an innovation on the theme is to adapt these ideas to the information age. Network-centric strategy calls for the "real time sharing of information" across the network in order to "leverage capabilities and resources" and achieve "force multiplier effects" in difficult situations.

Need to manage the fallout from a financial meltdown? Take it to the G20 and make it their problem. Having trouble with the Taliban in the mountains of Afghanistan? Send Hillary to Islamabad with a few billion dollars in her pocket and watch the Pakistani army give Mullah Omar a kicking in his own back yard. Got any issues with China? How about some joint exercises with the Indian Navy?

Of course here in South Africa we are past masters at concepts like network-centric warfare. Ask anyone who lived through the eighties and they will tell you that the regime was totally on the back foot because they couldn't quite pin the United Democratic Front (UDF) down. One minute it reared its head as the Soweto Civic Association, the next it shape-shifted into the End Conscription Campaign. Even the Black Sash kept the security branch awake at night. (They were right - it was a total onslaught.)

And it looks as if we finally have a president who is alive to the possibilities of a similar approach in the information age. Witness his interaction with the (almost) loyal opposition (if you chaps come up with good ideas they will be taken seriously), the civil service (do your duty, or else), traditional leaders (lead by example in the 21st century), the unions (we hear you, but you also have to come to the party) and organised business (ditto).

But it is in foreign policy that we are seeing the strategic vision of this administration unfold. In between attending the almost weekly G20 summits to deal with the multiplicity of global crises, the president has found time to stamp his authority (in the nicest possible way) on the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Newspapers are reporting that Joseph Kabila (Mugabe's last significant ally in the region after the defection of Angola) was recently summoned to the Union Buildings for a little fireside chat. This of course had nothing to do with the SADC security troika meeting scheduled in Mozambique the following day or the subsequent communiqué reminding all parties (i.e. Zanu-PF) that there is no alternative to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Also interesting is that presidential spokespeople regularly pop up on morning talk shows to emphasise "continuity and change". According to them, President Zuma is continuing the work begun by President Mbeki to "improve co-operation and collaboration" between states of the Union, but is also "adapting to new conditions" as they unfold. It sounds as if the team at the Union Buildings has been doing its homework when it comes to grand strategy. We're about to find out whether the same can be said for the likes of Robert Mugabe or Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.